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interesting introduction to the Cook and Schmidhauser studies that also
fall within this general area.
The painstaking and thorough study of the socialization of new
federal judges by Professor Cook presents both important theoretical
conclusions as well as significant practical conclusions. Cook has
thoroughly documented the need for policy makers to consider
alternatives other than additional judgeships to eliminate the legal log
jam found in the federal courts.
The Schmidhauser study presents strong evidence that members of the
Congress who also are lawyers do not assume more favorable attitudes
toward the Supreme Court than non-lawyers, as had been widely
assumed by much of the public media and by many scholars. Such a
conclusion is significant not only to scholars studying the role
perceptions of lawyers but also to policy makers attempting to work
toward a more favorable climate for the courts to function in.
As the studies reported here demonstrate, social science has important
contributions to make to the law in all of these areas. However, applied
research must be supplemented by significant basic theoretical research.
Applied research without substantive theoretical base will lead sooner or
later to the same condemnation of "infant social science" that was
voiced in connection with the Brown v. Board decision. Problem
oriented social science research cannot and will not endure unless it is
grounded in sound basic theoretical research. Although this criticism is
not applicable to the contributions in this symposium, if the present
trend emphasizing policy oriented research continues, it will be only a
matter of time before policy oriented research enters a state of decline.
Therefore, it is regrettable that the present symposium fails to strike a
balance between policy oriented research and basic theoretical studies.
Response -Francis M. Gaffney*
Professor Huntington Cairns, writing in 1935 on the relationship
between law and the social sciences, made the following observation:
No aspect of present legal thinking is more marked than its tendency to
levy upon all fields of knowledge for assistance in the analysis of
fundamental problems . . . . This characteristic results perhaps from the
departure from the view that law was entirely self-sufficient-that a
* Second year law student, Washington University School of Law.
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science of law could be framed on the basis of law itself-to an emphasis
upon purpose and function.'
In contrast, Professor Kenneth Clark, writing 25 years later in defense
of his and other social scientist's participation in the preparation of the
brief for the petitioner in Brown v. Board of Education, found it
necessary to argue that:
Serious discussion of whether a social scientist should play a role in the
legal processes related to the desegregation of public schools would seem
no more or less justified than discussion of the following questions:
Should social scientists play a role in helping industry function more
efficiently-make larger profits-develop better labor management
relations-increase the sense of satisfaction among workers?
Should social scientists play a role in helping governmental agencies
and key policy makers make more effective and valid decisions.2
In part, the shift away from reliance on social science data in the
solution of legal problems, evidenced by the contrast between Cairn's
observation and Clark's defense, may be attributed to a decline in the
importance of the Brandeis brief, which had proved to be relatively
ineffective when the objective was to overturn rather than uphold
legislation. 3 But to a greater extent, the shift may be explained by the
reluctance of judges and lawyers to allow fundamental rights to hinge on
the findings of "young, imprecise and changeful sciences".' Moreover,
the legal profession's impression as to the ephemeral character of social
science data, when coupled with Mr. Justice Holmes' injunction that the
constitution ought not to be tied to the social statics of Herbert Spencer
or to any other economic theory5 further widen the cleavage between the
disciplines.
It is against this background, of what may be termed reluctance and
skepticism on the part of the legal profession, that the potential import
and impact of, these contributions must be assessed. The approach
chosen places a heavy burden of proof on the political scientist; a burden
of proof which goes to the substance and accuracy of the findings of the
research presented in this symposium.
1. H. CAIRNS, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1 (1935).
2. Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist's Role, 5 VILL. L. REv. 224
(1959).
3. Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 153 (1955).
4. Id. 167. See also Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L. J. 320 (1957).
5. Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1904).
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Professor Grossman's imaginative application of Systems Analysis
Theory to the problem of the interrelationship between demand stress on
the judicial system (heavily loaded dockets) and culture, although
undoubtedly of hueristic value, suffers from a major limitation. Any
research on the impact of sub-cultures on the number and type of
demands placed on the judicial system presents, as the article clearly
indicates, theoretical and conceptual rather than statistical problems. In
short, before the research suggested by Professor Grossman can be
systematically undertaken, an operational definition of sub-culture must
be developed, a task which may unavoidably and paradoxically involve
preliminary research.
The main value of Professor Schmidhauser's impeccably researched
investigation of Congressional roll call behavior and interest group
activity in response to Supreme Court Decisions, stems from the fact
that the study lays to rest a number of rather naive hypotheses which
some "professional" court watchers have generated concerning the
attitudes of various groups toward the Court. In fact, so devastating is
Professor Schmidhauser's attack that it may well be termed empirical
over-kill. Additionally, the study conclusively establishes that the Court
is inextricably involved in the American political process. A few may
find the latter conclusion disquieting.
Professor Skogan's note on the persistence and operational validity of
the judicial myth, although a good example of the analytical power of
traditional survey research, is based on what I consider to be two
unwarranted assumptions. First, Professor Skoganimplicitly assumes
that persistence of the judicial myth is necessary for the maintenance of
sufficient levels of legitimating support for the judicial system. Second,
he explicitly bases his choice of student population on the assumption
that "the investigation of college students' perceptions of the
foundations of legitimacy should give us some estimate of the
parameters of that legitimacy."' The former assumption is, I believe,
open to serious debate; the latter is an empirical question.
Mr. Fahey's study of the enforcement of the felony marijuana law in
Chicago is an excellent example of careful empirical research. Mr.
Fahey's findings on the deterrence value of felony sanctions, informal
patterns of police and judicial enforcement, and the different standards
employed by narcotic and precinct officers in making arrests, could well
form the basis for a reevaluation of present narcotics laws. Moreover,
6. Skogan, A Note on the Judicial Myth at 309, 322 supra.
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Fahey's findings on minority group harassment should provide an
additional impetus to reexamine the arrest standards presently employed
by those responsible for narcotics law enforcement.
Professor Cook's analysis of the impact of seminar training for new
judges on the judicial output in multi-judge districts, is a superlative
example of applied social science research. Professor Cook's carefully
researched findings should be of immeasurable value to decision-makers
for two reasons. First, the study indicates that a mere increase in the
number of judges is not a complete answer to the problems of congested
dockets in the federal courts, thereby necessitating a search for other
alternatives. Second, the research design and methodology employed by
Cook could serve as an analog for continued and expanded research in
this area.
Professor Burnham's study of the differential impact of the Texas
voter registration system is undoubtedly the high point of the
symposium. Burnham's skilled analysis based on aggregate voting and
research data is evidence not only of Burnham's scholarship, but of the
advances made in recent years by the social sciences.
In light of Burnham's, Fahey's and Cook's studies, and to a lesser
extent those of Schmidhauser, Skogan, and Grossman, the question
which Professor Clark posed to the legal community becomes
tremendously important. Reformulated to correspond to the material
presented in this symposium, the question is: does the social scientist
have a role to play in helping judicial decision-makers make more
effective and valid decisions? Even when this question is juxtaposed with
the skepticism which has characterized the legal profession's attitudes
toward the social sciences, the answer would seem to be yes. The research
reported here does not bear the imprint of youth, imprecision or
changefulness. The studies by Grossman, Schmidhauser and Skogan are
indicative of a vital point in the maturation process of any science, the
stage at which basic hypotheses and notions are subjected to empirical
validation. Those by Burnham, Cook and Fahey are characteristic of a
maturing science which has achieved a sufficient degree of internal
development to enable its practitioners to turn to problem oriented
research. With these two activities going on simultaneously, there will
undoubtedly be changes within the social sciences, but the changes that
do occur will result in increased maturity. Given these trends within the
social sciences, and the law's desperate need for a reliable empirical base,
these studies may well harbinger a productive exchange between law and
the social sciences.
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